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Abstract
Voting power determines the “power” of individuals who cast votes; their power is based on their
ability to influence the winning-ness of a coalition. Usually each individual acts alone, casting
either all or none of their votes and is equally likely to do either. This paper extends this standard
“random voting” model to allow probabilistic voting, partial voting, and correlated team voting.
We extend the standard Banzhaf metric to account for these cases; our generalization reduces to
the standard metric under “random voting”, This new paradigm allows us to answer questions
such as “In the 2013 US Senate, how much more unified would the Republicans have to be in
order to have the same power as the Democrats in attaining cloture?”
Keywords. power indices, generating function, voting power, Banzhaf voting power, Congress,
cloture
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1 Introduction
In a weighted voting game there are players who cast votes. Analysis of the players’ voting power
has a long history with many models in use [4, 7]. The simplest voting model, “random voting”, is
when each voter is equally likely to support or oppose a motion. Even in this simple case there are
multiple ways to define the players’ power, the most common are the Shapley–Shubik power [10]
and the Banzhaf power [8, 11].
Forming coalitions is a way for voters to influence their voting power [5, 6]. Interestingly, Gelman
[5] proves “under the random voting model, this average voting power is maximized under simple
popular vote (majority rule) and is lower under any coalition system” and makes the observation
“Joining a coalition is generally beneficial to those inside the coalition but hurts those outside.”.
Not only can voters form coalitions, they can also vote probabilistically. Some papers [6] create
stochastic models for coalitions of voters.
While using generating functions to compute the Shapley–Shubik power or Banzhaf power
is well known, it has usually been in the context of counting combinatorial possibilities for the
“random voting” model. We have generalized the standard generating function approach to allow
more sophisticated models of voting to be analyzed.
The main results presented in this paper are the following:
1. We review how Banzhaf power is defined and then illustrate the well-known process of de-
termining Banzhaf power using generating functions for the “random voting” model. By
generalizing to (simple) weighted generating functions we show how to directly compute the
Banzhaf power; we do not determine it indirectly via the usually obtained combinatorial
counting.
2. Still using the “random voting” model we introduce Influence Polynomials; these are a proxy
for a player’s weighted generating function when used to compute the Banzhaf power.
3. We introduce a model of voting in which players have probabilities corresponding to the num-
ber of votes they cast. This is represented by a (general) weighted generating function, which
we call a voting structure. We show how to determine players’ Influence Polynomials from
their voting structures. These Influence Polynomials allow a generalized Banzhaf power to
be determined; this reduces to the usual Banzhaf power when the voting structure represents
the “random voting” model.
4. We create and analyze voting structures for a coalition represented by a leader. In these
coalitions each member follows the guidance of the leader probabilistically; not with certainty.
Several examples are given, including an example related to the US Senate.
2 Banzhaf power
In the usual way a weighted voting game is represented by the vector [q;w1, w2, ..., wn] where:
1. There are n players.
2. Player i has wi votes (with wi > 0).
3. A coalition is a subset of players.
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4. A coalition S is winning if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q, where q is the quota.
5. A game is proper if 12
∑
wi < q.
To define the Banzhaf power consider all 2n possible coalitions of players. For each coalition, if
player i can change the winning-ness of the coalition, by either entering or leaving the coalition,
then player i is marginal. The Banzhaf power index (β) of a player is proportional to the number
of times that a player is marginal; hence the total power of all players is 1.
As a continuing example consider the [6; 4, 3, 2, 1] weighted voting game where the the players
are named {A,B,C,D} and “random voting” is used. There are 24 = 16 subsets (or coalitions) of
four players; the following enumeration shows all coalitions (left) and the marginal players for each
(right):
1. { } → {}
2. {A} → {B,C}
3. {B} → {A}
4. {C} → {A}
5. {D} → {}
6. {A,B} → {A,B}
7. {A,C} → {A,C}
8. {A,D} → {B,C}
9. {B,C} → {A,D}
10. {B,D} → {A,C}
11. {C,D} → {A,B}
12. {A,B,C} → {A}
13. {A,B,D} → {A,B}
14. {A,C,D} → {A,C}
15. {B,C,D} → {B,C,D}
16. {A,B,C,D} → {}
Player A is marginal 10 times, players B, C are each marginal 6 times, and player D is marginal
2 times. The total number of times that players are marginal is 24=10 + 6 + 6 + 2. Hence player
A has Banzhaf power β(A) = 1024 =
5
12 . The other players have the powers: β(B) = β(C) =
6
24 =
1
4
and β(D) = 224 =
1
12 . These powers can be determined by hand as shown above or using an online
tool such as [9].
2.1 Banzhaf Power via Generating Functions
Imagine that each player in the [6; 4, 3, 2, 1] game can choose, with equal likelihood, to either be in
the coalition or to not be in the coalition. Using generating functions [3, 9] we represent the votes
that player A casts (i.e., 0 or 4) by the polynomial:
GA =
a0x0
2
+
a4x4
2
=
1
2
+
a4x4
2
(1)
Each term of this polynomial has the form ωanxn where n represents the number of votes cast
(e.g., a4x4 means that A casts 4 votes) and ω (e.g., 12 for each term here) represents the probability
of casting that many votes for a coalition. Note that the probabilities sum to one: GA|a=x=1 = 1.
While previous authors used generating functions to determine voting power, they did not include
the ω factor – they were counting the number of coalitions, not determining the probability of each.
In this paper we call a generating function of this type a “voting structure”.
Similarly, the votes cast by players {B,C,D} can be represented as
GB =
1
2
+
b3x3
2
. GC =
1
2
+
c2x2
2
. GD =
1
2
+
dx
2
. (2)
The letters {a, b, c, d} are used in order to understand the upcoming intermediate computations;
later all these variables will be given the numerical value one. Multiplying all four generating
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functions together yields
GAGBGCGD =
1
16
[
(a4b3c2d)x10 + (a4b3c2)x9 + (a4b3d)x8 + (a4b3 + a4c2d)x7
+ (a4c2 + b3c2d)x6 + (a4d+ b3c2)x5 + (a4 + b3d)x4
+ (b3 + c2d)x3 + (c2)x2 + (d)x + 1
]
Each term in this expression represents a coalition: the power of x indicates the total votes in that
coalition; the letters {a, b, c, d} indicate the coalition composition; and the numerical coefficient ( 116
for each term) is the probability of that coalition. For example, the x7 terms shows that there are
two 7 vote coalitions: {A,B} and {A,C,D}; each has probability 116 of occurring. Similarly there
are two 6 vote coalitions: {A,C} and {B,C,D}; each also has a probability 116 of occurring.
Let’s focus on Player A. While all coalitions with 6 or more votes is a winning coalition, they are
not necessarily coalitions that A made winning. For example, if the {A,B,C,D} coalition (with 10
votes) were to lose player A then it would still have 6 votes and would still be a winning coalition.
To identify the coalitions that A can make winning, we need to start with coalitions not involving
A that are not winning, add player A’s votes to them, and see which ones are then winning.
To find the non-winning coalitions not involving player A multiply the generating functions for
just the players {B,C,D}:
GBGCGD =
1
8
[
(b3c2d)x6 + (b3c2)x5 + (b3d)x4 + (b3 + c2d)x3 + (c2)x2 + (d)x+ 1
]
The coalitions that have a power xk with k ≤ q−1 are the coalitions that are not winning. Introduce
the following notation
Definition: For the polynomial Z(x) =
∑
i
δix
i define
{
Z(x)
}β
α
=
∑
α≤k≤β
δkx
k.
This extracts a set of consecutive terms in a polynomial.
so that the non-winning coalitions without A are:{
GBGCGD
}q−1
0
=
{
GBGCGD
}5
0
=
1
8
[ (
b3c2
)
x5 +
(
b3d
)
x4 +
(
b3 + c2d
)
x3 +
(
c2
)
x2 + (d)x+ 1
]
(3)
To determine which coalitions A can make winning, multiply Equation (3) by GA and extract
the winning coalitions, these are the xk terms with k ≥ q = 6:{
GA
{
GBGCGD
}q−1
0
}∞
q
=
{
GA
{
GBGCGD
}5
0
}∞
6
=
1
16
[ (
a4b3c2
)
x9 +
(
a4b3d
)
x8 +
(
a4b3 + a4c2d
)
x7 +
(
a4c2
)
x6
] (4)
This shows 5 coalitions that A has made winning; the first two are {A,B,C} and {A,B,D}. The
probability of these winning coalitions involving A is the numerical coefficient of each coalition.
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While the variables {a, b, c, d} in Equations (1) and (2) are useful for identifying coalitions, they
are not needed in the following. Replacing {a, b, c, d} with the value one in Equation (4) results in{
GA
{
GBGCGD
}q−1
0
}∞
q
∣∣∣∣∣
a=b=c=d==1
=
1
16
(
x9 + x8 + 2x7 + x6
)
That is, among the coalitions that A made winning there are: 2 with 7 votes and 1 with each of
6, 8, or 9 votes. Summing the above numerical coefficients (i.e., setting x = 1) determines the
probability that A has made any coalition winning:
ProbA ≡ Probability[Player A has made a coalition winning]
=
{
GA
{
GBGCGD
}q−1
0
}∞
q
∣∣∣∣∣
a=b=c=d=1
∣∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
1
16
(
x9 + x8 + 2x7 + x6
)∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
5
16
(5)
This can be interpreted as follows: if one of the 16 possible coalitions not involving A were selected
(uniformly) at random then 5/16th of the time that coalition is one for which A is marginal.
Similarly, by focusing on each of the other players one at a time, we can compute1 (the subscript
“V ” is used at mean “when a = b = c = d = x = 1”):
ProbB =
{
GB
{
GAGCGD
}q−1
0
}∞
q
∣∣∣∣∣
V
=
3
16
ProbC =
{
GC
{
GAGBGD
}q−1
0
}∞
q
∣∣∣∣∣
V
=
3
16
ProbD =
{
GD
{
GAGBGC
}q−1
0
}∞
q
∣∣∣∣∣
V
=
1
16
Computing the relative weights of these probabilities we recover the Banzhaf powers found earlier:
β(A) =
ProbA
ProbA + ProbB + ProbC + ProbD
=
5/16
12/16
=
5
12
β(B) =
ProbB
ProbA + ProbB + ProbC + ProbD
=
3/16
12/16
=
1
4
= β(C)
β(D) =
ProbD
ProbA + ProbB + ProbC + ProbD
=
1/16
12/16
=
1
12
(6)
Careful inspection reveals that the probabilistic computation in this section is identical to the
enumerative computation; just expressed differently. The probabilities found here
(
5
16 ,
3
16 ,
3
16 ,
1
16
)
are proportional to the counts (10, 6, 6, 2) found earlier, so the voting powers are the same.
1The intermediate computation is:{
GB
{
GAGCGD
}q−1
0
}
∞
q
=
1
16
[ (
b
3
d
)
x
8 +
(
a
4
b
3
)
x
7 +
(
b
3
c
2
d
)
x
6
]
{
GC
{
GAGBGD
}q−1
0
}
∞
q
=
1
16
[ (
a
4
c
2
d
)
x
7 +
(
a
4
c
2 + b3c2d
)
x
6
]
{
GD
{
GAGBGC
}q−1
0
}
∞
q
=
1
16
[ (
b
3
c
2
d
)
x
6
]
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2.2 Banzhaf Power via Influence Polynomials
Rewrite the computation appearing in Equation (5) as
ProbA =

GA
{
GBGCGD
}q−1
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(x)


∞
q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
{
GAR(x)
}∞
q
∣∣∣∣
x=1
where R(x) =
∑q−1
j=0 rjx
j is a polynomial of degree no more than q − 1. (We assume now that the
{a, b, c, d} terms all have the value one.) The constant part of GA cannot contribute to raising an
exponent of x to change a non-winning coalition into a winning coalition, as needed for the
{
·
}∞
q
computation, so it can be neglected and ProbA can be written as:
ProbA =
{
(Non-constant part of GA) R(x)
}∞
q
∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
{(
1
2
x4
)
R(x)
}∞
q
∣∣∣∣∣
x=1
=


(
1
2
x4
) q−1∑
j=0
rjx
j




∞
q
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
q−1∑
j=q−4
1
2
rj
=

 q−1∑
j=q−4
1
2
xj


︸ ︷︷ ︸
IA(x)
⊗

q−1∑
j=0
rjx
j


= IA(x)⊗R(x)
(7)
where we have defined the Influence Polynomial for A, IA(x) with degree q − 1, and we have
introduced the following notation:
Definition: For two polynomials R(x) =
∑
j
rjx
j and S(x) =
∑
j
sjx
j define the sum of
product coefficients to be R(x)⊗ S(x) =
∑
j
rjsj . That is, the coefficients of common
powers are multiplied together and then added.
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The representation in Equation (7) is exactly equivalent to the expression in Equation (5).
Similarly
ProbB = IB(x)⊗
{
GAGCGD
}q−1
0
IB(x) =
q−1∑
j=q−3
1
2
xj
ProbC = IC(x)⊗
{
GAGBGD
}q−1
0
IC(x) =
q−1∑
j=q−2
1
2
xj
ProbD = ID(x)⊗
{
GAGBGC
}q−1
0
ID(x) =
q−1∑
j=q−1
1
2
xj
(8)
This section has used influence polynomials to compute the voting probabilities for the simplest
voting structure, when a voter is equally likely to cast all or none of their votes (“random voting”).
The paradigm of using influence polynomials also works for votes distributed partially or non-
uniformly. The next section shows how to compute the influence polynomial in these cases.
3 Non-Uniform Probabilities
The generating function in Equation (1) represents the votes that player A can cast for a coalition
and represents two equally likely situations, that “none” or “all” of the available votes were cast.
In more complex situations, weighted generating functions can capture how players distribute their
votes in ways that are not all or nothing and to vote with non-uniform probabilities. For example,
we might choose
GA =
1
10a
0x0 + 410a
2x2 + 310a
3x3 + 210a
4x4 (9)
which we interpret as follows: Player A will contribute 0 votes to a coalition 1/10 of the time, 2
votes 4/10 of the time, 3 votes 3/10 of the time, and 4 votes 2/10 of the time.
Now we must interpret what it means for a player to be marginal when that player can exercise
non-uniform and partial voting. It is no longer adequate to merely multiply the vote structures
(i.e., generating functions) together as in Equation (5), as we now indicate. Imagine that player A
has the voting structure GA = x
4; that is, they give all 4 of their votes to every coalition. Blindly
using Equation (5) would give ProbA =
5
8 . This is a larger value than what was obtained in the
random voting model, and must be wrong. If player A always give 4 votes to every coalition, then
we claim that player A has no power. This is because player A has lost the ability to influence
any coalition; the other players always know what player A will do, in any circumstance. Think
of this in a political context: if a politician has already decided to vote for (or against) a piece
of legislation then they cannot influence that legislation. The framers of the legislation will only
modify the legislation to influence undecided voters.
In general, if a player always casts all, or none, of their votes then that player cannot ever be
marginal. Stated differently, whenever a player cannot influence others by having the ability to
change the winning-ness of coalitions, then that player has no power.
Let’s work through an example. Assume, as usual, that q votes are needed for a coalition to be
winning. Suppose that a coalition not including player A already has Z votes with Z < q and that
player A has the vote structure in Equation (9). Then there is a probability that each coalition
without player A will become, after player A votes, winning (v) or losing (1− v).
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Consider, for example, what this means when v = 99%. While player A is nearly always giving
enough votes to make the coalition winning, the other players know that only 1% of time will player
A keep the coalition from being winning. Hence, player A will get little attention from the other
players – there is little of player A’s behavior that can be influenced. Now consider instead what
v = 60% means; more than half the time player A gives enough votes for the coalition to be winning
but a large fraction of the time (40%) player A is not giving enough votes for a coalition to be
winning. In this case player A is much more influential in determining whether or not a coalition
is going to be winning.
We define player A’s ability to be marginal to be equal to the percentage of votes that are “in
play”, the minimum of v and 1 − v; define γ = min(v, 1 − v). When v = 99% then there is only
γ = 1% that is “in play” and player A’s influence is small; when v = 60% then γ = 40% and
player A’s votes need to be negotiated by the other players – player A is more of a “swing voter”
in this case.
With this thinking the Influence Polynomial for any vote structure is determined as follows:
1. Assume the vote structure for a player is: G =
q−1∑
j=0
gjx
j where some {gj} may be zero
2. Define the partial sums: vZ =
q−1∑
j=q−Z
gj and γZ = min(vZ , 1− vZ) for Z = 1, 2, . . . , q − 1
3. Then the Influence Polynomial for that player is I(x) =
q−1∑
Z=1
γZx
Z
This definition is consistent with the evaluations given earlier, for “random voting”, as shown in
the next section. Table 1 shows the Influence Polynomial computations for the vote structure in
Equation (9); the result is
IA(x) = 0x
1 + 210x
2 + 510x
3 + 110x
4 + 110x
5
Using the Influence Polynomial IA(x) we define the Influence of A, I(A), to be:
I(A) = IA(x)⊗
{
GBGCGD
}q−1
0
(10)
which is a generalization of the probability defined in Equations (7) and (8). This becomes the
probability shown in those equations when a player is using “random voting”. Once the influences
have been determined for each player, they are normalized as in Equation (6) to determine what
we define to be the Generalized Banzhaf power; for player A this is denoted β′(A).
The Generalized Banzhaf power is a generalization of the Banzhaf power that accounts for
arbitrary voting structures. For random voting, the Generalized Banzhaf power is the Banzhaf
power.
3.1 Influence Polynomial for Random Voting
The Influence Polynomials as defined algorithmically in the last section is consistent with the values
given in Equation (8), as we now show. Assume use of random voting, that is:
GN =
1
2
+
XN
2
=
1
2
q−1∑
j=0
(δj0 + δjN )x
j
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Number of votes
coalition has
without player A
Probability of
coalition winning
with A’s votes: vZ
Probability of
coalition not
winning with A’s
votes: (1− vZ)
Fraction of A’s votes
that are “in play”:
γZ = min(vZ , 1− vZ)
xZ
Z = 1 0 1 0 x1
Z = 2 210
8
10
2
10 x
2
Z = 3 510 =
2
10 +
3
10
5
10
5
10 x
3
Z = 4 910 =
2
10 +
3
10 +
4
10
1
10
1
10 x
4
Z = 5 910 =
2
10 +
3
10 +
4
10
1
10
1
10 x
5
Table 1: A coalition without player A has Z votes and a winning coalition needs q = 6 votes; player
A votes using the vote structure in Equation (9).
where δij is the usual Kronecker delta and N ≤ q − 1. Using the procedure for determining the
Influence Polynomial in the last section (recall Z ≤ q − 1), we compute
vZ =
q−1∑
j=q−Z
gj =
1
2
q−1∑
j=q−Z
(δj0 + δjN ) =
{
1
2 Z ≥ q −N
0 Z < q −N
γZ = min(vZ , 1− vZ) =
{
1
2 Z ≥ q −N
0 otherwise
I(x) =
q−1∑
Z=1
γZx
Z =
1
2
q−1∑
Z=q−N
xZ =
1
2
(
xq−N + xq−N+1 + · · ·+ xq−1
)
If, for example, q = 6 and N = 3 then I(x) =
1
2
(
x3 + x4 + x5
)
as shown in Equation (8) for
player B.
3.2 Example: [6;4,3,2,1] game with one player having non-uniform votes
We assume the voting structures appearing in Equations (2) and (9)
GA =
1
10 +
4
10x
2 + 310x
3 + 210x
4,
GB =
1
2 +
1
2x
3, GC =
1
2 +
1
2x
2, GD =
1
2 +
1
2x
for which the Influence Polynomials have been determined to be:
IA(x) =
2
10x
2 + 510x
3 + 110x
4 + 110x
5
IB(x) =
1
2
(
x3 + x4 + x5
)
IC(x) =
1
2
(
x4 + x5
)
ID(x) =
1
2
(
x5
)
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Figure 1: Generalized Banzhaf powers for [6; 4, 3, 2, 1] game when player A has vote structure
GA = (1− p) + px
4.
Using Equation (10) and its analogues we find the influences {I(A), I(B), I(C), I(D)}. Normalizing
the influences by their sum gives the Generalized Banzhaf powers {β′(A), β′(B), β′(C), β′(D)}:
I(A) = 740 , I(B) =
13
40 , I(C) =
3
20 , I(D) =
1
10 ,
β′(A) = 730 , β
′(B) = 1330 , β
′(C) = 630 , β
′(D) = 430 ,
3.3 Example: [6;4,3,2,1] game with one player voting parametrically
For the [6; 4, 3, 2, 1] game suppose that players B, C, and D vote as before; that is, using random
voting (each is equally likely to give no votes or all votes). Suppose now that player A gives 0 votes
with probability 1 − p and gives 4 votes with probability p; that is player A has the parametric
vote structure (with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1)
GA = (1− p) + px
4
For this voting structure, IA(x) =
(
x2 + x3 + x4 + x5
)
min(p, 1− p) and
β′(A) =
5min(1− p, p)
∆4
, β′(B) = β′(C) =
1 + p
∆4
, β′(D) =
1− p
∆4
(11)
where ∆4 = 3 + p+ 5min(1− p, p). These results are shown in Figure 1. Observe that:
1. Player A has a Generalized Banzhaf power of zero when p = 0 or p = 1. This is expected,
player A has no power when there are no votes “in play”.
2. Player A has a maximal Generalized Banzhaf power when p = 12 . This is expected, this is
when player A has the most votes “in play”.
3. Players B and C always have the same Generalized Banzhaf power.
4. When p = 0 (player A casts no votes) the game is the same as [6; 3, 2, 1] for the players
{B,C,D}. In this case players B, C, and D all have equal Generalized Banzhaf power of 13 ,
which is the same as their Banzhaf power.
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Figure 2: The Generalized Banzhaf powers for the voting structures in Equations (12), (13), and
(14).
5. When p = 1 (player A casts 4 votes) the game is the same as [2; 3, 2, 1] for the players
{B,C,D}; this is an improper game, but the meaning is clear. In this case players B and C
have equal Generalized Banzhaf power of 12 and player D has a Generalized Banzhaf power
of zero.
In the [6; 4, 3, 2, 1] game a player other than player A could vote parametrically. In the following
three examples player B, C, or D gives 0 votes with probability 1 − p and gives all its votes
with probability p; in each case the other players use random voting. Figure 2 shows the results
graphically.
1. The voting structures and Generalized Banzhaf powers when player B votes parametrically:
GA =
1
2
(
1 + x4
)
, GB = (1− p) + px
3, GC =
1
2
(
1 + x2
)
, GD =
1
2 (1 + x)
β′(A) =
2 + p
∆3
, β′(B) =
3min(1− p, p)
∆3
, β′(C) =
2− p
∆3
, β′(D) =
p
∆3
(12)
where ∆3 = 4 + p+ 3min(1− p, p)
2. The voting structures and Generalized Banzhaf powers when player C votes parametrically:
GA =
1
2
(
1 + x4
)
, GB =
1
2
(
1 + x3
)
, GC = (1− p) + px
2, GD =
1
2 (1 + x)
β′(A) =
2 + p
∆2
, β′(B) =
2− p
∆2
, β′(C) =
3min(1− p, p)
∆2
, β′(D) =
p
∆2
(13)
where ∆2 = 4 + p+ 3min(1− p, p)
3. The voting structures and Generalized Banzhaf powers when player D votes parametrically:
GA =
1
2
(
1 + x4
)
, GB =
1
2
(
1 + x3
)
, GC =
1
2
(
1 + x2
)
, GD = (1− p) + px
β′(A) =
3− p
∆1
, β′(B) =
1 + p
∆1
, β′(C) =
1 + p
∆1
, β′(D) =
min(1− p, p)
∆1
(14)
where ∆1 = 5 + p+min(1− p, p)
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4 Teams and Leaders
Another generalization of traditional voting is to consider “teams” (or coalitions) of players that
work together, although not with complete unanimity. For example, for the [6; 4, 3, 2, 1] game
assume that player A (with 4 votes) represents a team (shown as Ateam) of 3 members {a1, a2, a3}
with the first two members having 1 vote each and the last member having 2 votes.
Suppose the following:
1. Ateam has a leader who influences how the Ateam members cast their votes. We define the
leader’s power to the same as their team’s power.
2. The Ateam leader wants each individual Ateam member to cast their votes with probability L
and to not cast their votes with probability (1− L).
3. Each individual Ateam member follow their leader’s desire with probability p and each member
does so independently of other team members.
In this case the appropriate generating function representation of Ateam’s votes is
GAteam = L

((1− p) + apx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
member a1
(
(1− p) + apx
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
member a2
(
(1− p) + a2px2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
member a3


+(1− L)

(p+ a(1− p)x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
member a1
(
p+ a(1 − p)x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
member a2
(
p+ a2(1− p)x2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
member a3


(15)
The first term (with the L coefficient) represents the votes cast if the leader wishes Ateam to be
part of a coalition, the second term (with the (1 − L) coefficient) represents the votes cast if the
leader wishes Ateam to not be part of a coalition. The generating functions for each member are
multiplied together, in each sub-expression, since each team member acts independently.
As before, this generating function has x exponents of 0, 1, . . . , 4 representing the number of
votes that Ateam can cast. Note that the expression is correctly normalized; GAteam |a=x=1 = 1 for
any value of p. Table 2 interprets GAteam for specific values of L and p.
4.1 Teams whose members each have one vote
An important special case is a team whose members each have one vote. For example, this could
represent Congress where each Congressperson has one vote for their team; and the teams are
called Democrats, Republicans, or Independents. The voting structure for a team (Guniform team)
of n members, where each member has a single vote is:
Guniform team = L
(
(1− p) + px
)n
+ (1− L)
(
p+ (1− p)x
)n
(16)
Special cases of this are:
• If p = 12 then Guniform team =
(
1
2 +
1
2x
)n
independent of L.
(This is reasonable, team members are not influenced by their leader’s choice.)
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Parameter values Value of GAteam Interpretation
p = 1 L
(
a4x4
)
+ (1− L)
All players vote exactly as their leader wishes.
Structurally this has the form of one player voting
parametrically.
p = 1, L =
1
2
1
2
+
a4x4
2
Players vote exactly as the leader wishes and the
leader is equally likely to support or oppose joining a
coalition. GAteam is the same as GA in Equation (1).
p = 1, L = 1 a4x4 Players vote exactly as the leader wishes and the
leader wants to join a coalition. All 4 votes are cast.
p = 1, L = 0 1
Players vote exactly as the leader wishes and the
leader is opposed to joining a coalition. No votes are
cast.
p =
1
2
1
8
(ax+ 1)2(a2x2 + 1) Players vote randomly and are not following their
leader. GAteam does not depend on L.
p = 0 L+ (1− L)a4x4
Players do the exact opposite of what their leader
wants. Structually this has the form of one player
voting parametrically.
p→ 1− p
and
L→ 1− L
GAteam
If the leader switches their desire to join a coalition
and the players switch their likelihood of following
their leader, the result is the same.
Table 2: Interpretation of GAteam from Equation (15) for selected parameter values.
• If p = 1 then Guniform team = Lx
n + (1− L)
(This is reasonable, with complete unanimity the team acts like one voter who distributes all
the votes or none of the votes.)
Figure 3 shows the coefficients of GAteam when n = 50 for various values of L and p. Since n is large
the coefficients closely approximate either a Gaussian (when p = 12) of the sum of two Gaussians.
Figure 4 shows the coefficients of the Influence Polynomials for GAteam when n = 50 for the same
values of L and p.
4.2 Example: [6;4,3,2,1] game when first player is a team
Consider a voting structure where Ateam has 3 members (using Equation (15) with individual
weights of {2, 1, 1}) while the other players use uniform voting
GAteam = L
[(
(1− p) + px
)2 (
(1− p) + px2
)]
+ (1− L)
[(
p+ (1− p)x
)2 (
p+ (1− p)x2
)]
GB =
1
2 +
1
2x
3, GC =
1
2 +
1
2x
2, GD =
1
2 +
1
2x
(17)
the Generalized Banzhaf power for team A is shown in Figure 5 (left) as a function of L and p.
Now consider a voting structure where Ateam has 4 identical members (using Equation (16),
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Figure 3: The polynomial coefficients of Guniform team in Equation (16) when n = 50 for p = 0.1
(black, solid line), p = 0.3 (blue, dotted line), and p = 0.5 (green, dashed line). Values of L are
L = 0.1 (left), L = 0.3 (middle), and L = 0.5 (right).
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Figure 4: The polynomial coefficients of the Influence Polynomial obtained from Guniform team in
Equation (16). The parameters {n, p, L} are the same as in Figure 3.
each team A member has 1 vote) while the other players use uniform voting
GAteam = L
(
(1− p) + px
)4
+ (1− L)
(
p+ (1− p)x
)4
GB =
1
2 +
1
2x
3, GC =
1
2 +
1
2x
2, GD =
1
2 +
1
2x
(18)
the Generalized Banzhaf power for team A is shown in Figure 5 (right) as a function of L and p.
In both of these cases:
1. The symmetry represented by {p, L} → {1− p, 1− L} is apparent
2. For any value of L the maximum power for each Ateam is attained when p = 12 .
3. When p = 12 the maximum power for each A
team is attained when L = 0 or L = 1.
4. When p is zero or one and L is zero or one then Ateam has zero power.
In each case, Ateam has the most power when the members are least predictable (p = 12) and the
leader is decisive (either L = 0 or L = 1)
4.3 The US Senate
The techniques developed in this paper can be applied to political voting. Consider the 113th
Congress, 1st Session (started January 2013) where there were 52 Democrats, 46 Republicans, and
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Figure 5: Contour plots of β′(A) when team A has 3 members (left, Equation (17)) or 4 members
(right, Equation (18)). The L axis (0 to 1) is horizontal, the p axis (12 to 1) is vertical. For all the
contour plots in this paper the color scale goes from 0 (blue) to 12 (red).
2 Independents in the Senate [1]. To obtain cloture2 in the Senate 60 votes are sometimes needed;
this naturally leads to the [60; 53, 45, 2] game. We assume a voting structure in which the Democrats
and Republican teams have members each casting a single vote according to Equation (16) and the
Independents use “random voting” (are equally likely to give 0 or 2 votes to any coalition). That
is:
GDteam = LD
(
(1− pD) + pDx
)53
+ (1− LD)
(
pD + (1− pD)x
)53
GRteam = LR
(
(1− pR) + pRx
)45
+ (1− LR)
(
pR + (1− pR)x
)45
GI =
1
2 +
1
2x
2
(19)
where pD (resp. pR) represents the probability that an individual Democrat (resp. Republican)
votes the way their leader desires as indicated by LD (resp. LR).
The Washington Post [2] lists the frequency with which Democratic and Republican senators
voted with their party for the 112th Congress. For the Democrats the average value was 94% while
for the Republicans it was 84%; we refer to this as the cohesion value. For the 113th Congress, we
assume the values pR = 0.94 and pD = 0.84 for the Democratic and Republican cohesion.
When both the Democratic leader and the Republican leaders agree on an issue then there is
little contention. Voting power becomes interesting when one team is in favor of an action (L = 1)
and the other team is opposed (L = 0). Hence, consider two cases:
1. The Democratic leader wants to obtain cloture (LD = 1) while the Republican leader is
opposed to it (LR = 0). The Generalized Banzhaf power for the teams at the cohesion value
are: Democrats 0.35, Republicans 0.35, Independents 0.30.
It is somewhat surprising that the Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all have similar
power, especially since the Independents have only two members!
2. The Republican leader wants to obtain cloture (LR = 1) while the Democratic leader is
2“Cloture is a motion or process in parliamentary procedure aimed at bringing debate to a quick end.” [12]
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opposed to it (LD = 0). The Generalized Banzhaf power for the teams at the cohesion value
are: Democrats 0.41, Republicans 0.31, Independents 0.28.
The Generalized Banzhaf power for the three teams as pD and pR are varied, is shown in Figure 6.
Partial derivatives indicate how the Generalized Banzhaf values change as the cohesion value
changes. At the cohesion point, (pR, pD) = (0.94, 0.84), we numerically compute:
1. When (LD = 1) and (LR = 0):
∂β′(Dem)
∂pD
= 0.04,
∂β′(Dem)
∂pR
= −0.36,
∂β′(Rep)
∂pD
= 0.06,
∂β′(Rep)
∂pR
= −0.37.
In this case, interestingly, both the Democrats and the Republicans increase their power if
either the Democratic cohesion increases or the Republican cohesion decreases.
2. When (LR = 1) and (LD = 0):
∂β′(Dem)
∂pD
= −1.1,
∂β′(Dem)
∂pR
= 0.25,
∂β′(Rep)
∂pD
= 0.44,
∂β′(Rep)
∂pR
= −0.08.
In this case, the Democrats’ power increases if either the Democratic cohesion decreases or
the Republican cohesion increases. Just the opposite is true for the Republicans; their power
increases if either the Democratic cohesion increases or the Republican cohesion decreases.
In each of these cases the Republicans can adopt the same strategy to increase their power: increase
Democratic cohesion or decrease Republican cohesion.
5 Summary
We have shown how to determine voting power when each player in a weighted voting game has a
“voting structure”, a weighted generating function representing probabilities of them contributing
any number of their votes to a coalition. The resulting Generalized Banzhaf values can be computed
with polynomial arithmetic and reduce to the usual Banzhaf values when random voting is used.
Voting structures can also be used to represent voter coalitions. In this case each coalition who
tries to influence the voting of each coalition member. This model was applied to the US Senate to
show who has (Democrats, Republicans, or Independents) more power in attaining cloture. When
the Democrats are in favor of cloture and the Republicans are not then, surprisingly, all three
parties have similar power.
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